Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 4 Issue 4 - October 1964

Article 2

10-1964

Raising the Perpetuities Question: Conception, Adoption, "Wait
and See," and Cy Pres
Robert J. Lynn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert J. Lynn, Raising the Perpetuities Question: Conception, Adoption, "Wait and See," and Cy Pres, 17
Vanderbilt Law Review 1391 (1964)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol17/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Raising the Perpetuities Question:
Conception, Adoption, "Wait and
See," and Cy Pres
Robert . Lynn*
Approximately one-fifth of the jurisdictions of the United States
have reformed the orthodox Rule Against Perpetuities by adopting
the "wait and see" or cy pres version of the Rule, or a combination
of the latter two. In this article Professor Lynn examines the problem
of raising the perpetuities question under all three versions, with particular attention to the problems of conception, adoption and the preservation of sperm. The author emphasizes that reforming the Rule does
not eliminate perpetuities problems-it minimizes them. He concludes
that the courts are free under the new versions of the Rule or under
the orthodox version to interpret the Rule in light of changing conditions in order to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the
grantor, settlor, or testator.

1. INTRODUCTION
Applying the orthodox, the "wait and see," or the cy pres version
of the Rule Against Perpetuities presupposes analyzing the limitations in the dispositive instrument as of the time of their creation
to determine whether any gifts are future, whether any future gifts

are remainders or executory interests, and whether any remainders or
executory interests are contingent. If a contingent future interest
might vest, if it vests at all, at a remote time, it is bad ab initio under
the orthodox form of the Rule. That being so, the perpetuities question may properly be raised at the time the contingent future interest

is created-and the perpetuities question frequently is raised and

settled when the contingent future interest is created because many
future gifts are made by will, and construction of the instrument is
sought as an incident to probate. But some courts have deferred

settling a perpetuities question as long as possible.' The refusal of
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
1. See, e.g., Lauck's Estate, 358 Pa. 369, 57 A.2d 855 (1948); Miller Trust, 351
Pa. 144, 40 A.2d 484 (1945); Reeds Estate, 342 Pa. 54, 19 A.2d 365 (1941); Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 AtI. 85 (1938). Mechem doubts that the practice is
widespread. Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 979 (1959). There are occasional cases elsewhere postponing resolution of the perpetuities problem. E.g., B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v.
Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E.2d 777 (1950); In re Herrmann, 130 N.J. Eq. 273,
22 A.2d 262 (Prerog. Ct. 1941); Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200
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the courts to settle perpetuities questions until circumstances made
judgment imperative was used in Pennsylvania to buttress the case
for reforming the Rule.2 Nevertheless, the test for validity under the
Rule in orthodox form is a possibilities test,3 and generally speaking,
the perpetuities question may properly be raised whenever the
validity of a contingent future interest is a relevant factor in decision.
In 1947 Pennsylvania reformed the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities by enacting a "wait and see" statute. It provides that
upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against
perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events any interest
not then vested and any interest in members of a4 class the membership of
which is then subject to increase shall be void.

In 1963 California reformed the Rule by enacting a cy pres statute.
It provides that
no interest in real or personal property is either void or voidable as in
violation of [the Rule] if and to the extent that it can be reformed or
construed within the limits of [the Rule] to give effect to the general intent
of the creator of the interest whenever that general intent can be ascertained.
This section shall be liberally construed and applied to validate such
interest to the fullest extent consistent with such ascertained intent.5
Aft. 467 (1938). In First Portland Nat'l Bank v. Rodrique, 157 Me. 277, 172 A.2d
107 (1961), the Supreme Court of Maine acknowledged the policy but did not apply
it in the case before the court.
2. Br6gy, A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities, 23 TMiP. L.Q. 313,
320 (1950).
3. Lynn, A PracticalGuide to the Rule Against Perpetuities,1964 DuKE L.J. 207, 213.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950). A complementary statute reads as
follows: "(a) A valid interest following a void interest in income shall be accelerated
to the termination date of the last preceding valid interest. (b) A void interest following a valid interest on condition subsequent or special limitation shall vest in the
owner of such valid interest. (c) Any other void interest shall vest in the person or
persons entitled to the income at the expiration of the period described in [the Pennsylvania statute set out in the text]." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.5 (1950).
The language of section 301.4 is unnecessarily awkward. A simple form of "wait and
saee" is a paraphrase of John Chipman Gray's statement of the Rule. Gray's statement
is as follows: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twentyone years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." GnAx, THE RuLsE
AcANsT PEs run-Es 191 (4th ed. 1942). Omitting must and changing vest to vests
result in a "wait and see" version of the Rule: "No interest is good unless it vests,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest."
5. CAL. Crv. CoDE ANN. § 715.5. California returned to the common law Rule
relatively recently. Recent Legislation, 48 CAtu. L. REv. 134 (1960). The Rule was
modified in 1963 by the repeal of §§ 693, 694, and 695 of the Civil Code (defining
vested and contingent future interests), and the enactment of § 715.5 (establishing
cy pres), § 715.6 (establishing a sixty-year period in gross), § 715.7 (eliminating the
"unborn widow" construction), and § 715.8 (redefining a vested interest). The
constitutionality of § 715.8 has been doubted. Review of 1963 Code Legislation, 38
CALIF. ST. B.J. 643 (1963). The repeal of § 715.8 has been demanded. Comment,
16 STAN. L. REv. 177 (1963).
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Several states have combined the "wait and see" and cy pres principles.
Kentucky's statute is as follows:
In determining whether an interest would violate the rule against perpetuities the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than
possible events; provided, however, the period shall not be measured by
any lives whose continuance does not have a causal relationship to the
vesting or failure of the interest. Any interest which would violate said rule
to
as thus modified shall be reformed, within the limits of that rule,
6
approximate most closely the intention of the creator of the interest.

New Hampshire adopted both "wait and see" and cy pres by judicial
decision. 7 In a few states, "wait and see" and cy pres exist in limited
or modified form." The common law Rule Against Perpetuities in
orthodox form exists in about three-fourths of the jurisdictions in the

United States.9

Raising the perpetuities question under the orthodox, "wait and
see," and cy pres versions of the Rule is the subject of this article.
Particular attention is given to problems of conception, adoption,

and the preservation of sperm.
II. TBE ORTHODOX RuLE
Under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities in orthodox
form, the validity of a contingent future interest ordinarily is determined as of the time the instrument of transfer takes effect and a
STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (1963). Vermont has a similar statute. VT.
tit. 27, § 501 (1959). The Kentucky statute is both superseded and

6. Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN.

complemented by statutes which read as follows:
"The estate known at common law as the fee simple determinable and the interest
known as the possibility of reverter are abolished. Words which at common law
would create a fee simple determinable shall be construed to create a fee simple
subject to a right of entry for condition broken. In any case where a person would
have a possibility of reverter at common law, he shall have a right of entry." Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 381.218 (1963).
"A fee simple subject to a right of entry for condition broken shall become a fee
simple absolute if the specified contingency does not occur within thirty years from
the effective date of the instrument creating such fee simple subject to a right of entry.
If such contingency occurs within said thirty years the right of entry, which may be
created in a person other than the person creating the interest or his heirs, shall become
Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN.
exercisable notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities .....
§ 381.219 (1963).
7. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953); Edgerly v.
Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Atl. 900 (1891).
8. Limited "wait and see" and cy pres statutes exist in Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-95, -96 (1960); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 160, §§ 27, 28 (Michie Supp. 1963); Mi. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 197A
(Michie Supp. 1963); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 184A, §§ 1, 2 (1955). The Washington
statute is applicable to interests crfeated by trusts only. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§
11.98.010-.030 (1963). The Idaho statute may include a cy pres feature applicable
to interests created by trusts. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957).
9. Lynn, supra note 3, at 208.
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declaration of invalidity ordinarily is permissible at that time. Thus,
if A, owning land in fee simple absolute, devises "to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first attains twenty-five," and B is a
bachelor at A's death, the invalidity of the contingent remainder is
demonstrable at A's death. Invalidity turns on the possibility that B
might have a child who might attain twenty-five at a remote time.
Invalidity turns on the possibility of issue even though B is incapable
of conceiving a child at and after A's death.
Although the validity of a contingent future interest under the
orthodox Rule ordinarily is determined as of the time the instrument
of transfer takes effect, there is a familiar exception to the general
rule. The validity of an appointment made by the exercise of a
general testamentary or a special power is determined by "reading
back" or interpolating the appointment into the instrument creating
the power, computing the perpetuities period from the time the
power was created, and considering facts existing at the time of the
appaintment.10 For example, if A bequeaths 100,000 dollars in trust
10. 6 A mc.N LA-W OF PROPERTY § 24.35 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 PowEn,, REAL
§ 788(3) (1962); 3 Snms & Smrnr, FurruRE INTRESTs § 1274 (2d ed.
1956). A less familiar example of "wait and see" under the orthodox Rule is demonstrated by the following: A bequeaths $10,000 "to that son of B who first becomes a
clergyman, but if B dies without having a son, or if no son of B becomes a clergyman,
then to C." No son of B is a clergyman at A's death, and "son of B" is construed to
mean "son of B whenever born." The contingent executory interest to that son of B
who first becomes a clergyman is bad under the Rule because the contingency might
be resolved beyond the perpetuities period, namely, B's lifetime and twenty-one years.
The contingent executory interest in C that is expressly conditioned on B's dying without having a son is good under the Rule because the contingency must be resolved
at a time no later than B's death, and B is a life in being at A's death. The contingent executory interest that is expressly conditioned on no son of B becoming a clergyman is bad under the Rule because the contingency might be resolved beyond the
perpetuities period. If B dies without having a son, the executonr interest in C
becomes possessory. If B has a son or sons, none of whom becomes a clergyman, the
executory interest in C is bad under the Rule even though no son of B has become
a clergyman at B's death, and B's sons surviving him all die within twenty-one years
after B's death, none having become a clergyman. 6 AmcAN LAW oF PRoPERTY §
24.54 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 Svmts & Smrrir, FuTUrE INTERESTs § 1257 (2d ed. 1956).
In First Portland Nat'l Bank v. Rodrigue, 157 Me. 277, 172 A.2d 107 (1961),
the testator created a testamentary trust of shares of stock to pay annuities in stipulated
sums and shares from the income to his widow and children. Principal was distributable
(1) at the death of the widow, provided that (a) the trust had been in operation for
twenty-five years or (b) that the stock had been sold by the trustee; or (2) at the
sale of the stock after the death of the widow and prior to the expiration of the twentyfive years; or (3) at the expiration of the twenty-five years. Principal was distributable
under the following language: "first; to my son, William one hundred (100) shares
of . . . stock . . . or if the same shall have been sold the equivalent money value
thereof; second; the remaining portion of said trust fund shall be distributed in equal
portions to my said children, Helen, Marcia, William and George, issue of a deceased
child to take its parent's share by right of representation; in the event that any of my
said children shall have died prior to the termination of said trust leaving no children
or issue of a deceased child, his or her portion of said trust fund on the termination
Qf said trust ... shall be divided equally among his or her brothers and sisters .... "
PROPERTY
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"to pay the net income to B for life, and then to pay the principal to
such of the children of B as B shall by deed or will appoint, and in
default of appointment, to pay the principal to C and his heirs," and B
by will appoints the entire principal "to such of my [B's] children as
attain twenty-five," the appointment is good under the Rule if the
youngest of B's children is at least four years old at B's death. "Read
back" into A's will, the appointment is the equivalent of "to pay the
net income to B for life, and then to pay the principal to such of the
children of B as survive B and attain twenty-five no later than
twenty-one years after B's death." Even if the youngest of B's children.was born after the creation of the power, he will attain twentyfive, or not, within twenty-one years after the death of B, a person
alive at the creation of the power.
A. Preservation of Sperm Under the Orthodox Rule
If A devises "to B for life, remainder to such of the children of B
as attain twenty-one," and "children" is construed to mean "children of
B alive at A's death," the remainder is good under the orthodox Rule.
If a child of B alive at A's death has not attained twenty-one at A's
death, he will attain twenty-one, or not, within his own lifetime, and
he is a "iffe in being" at A's death. Put shortly, the ultimate number
of children sharing in the remainder will be fixed within the perpetuities period, and the requirements of the Rule are satisfied. Even
if "children" is construed to mean "children of B whenever born,"
the remainder is good under the orthodox Rule. A child of B, even
a posthumous child, will attain twenty-one, or not, no later than
twenty-one years after the lifetime of B and a period of gestation,
and B is a 'life in being" at A's death. Again, the ultimate number
of children sharing in the remainder will be fixed within the perpetuities period, and the requirements of the Rule are satisfied.
B, anticipating death, might preserve his sperm." B might be
survived by a widow capable of conceiving a child. Consequently,
B's widow might conceive a child by B through artificial insemination
The testator was survived by his widow and the four children named in the will.
The successor trustee under the will sought construction, and some of the parties to
the proceeding argued a violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The Supreme Court of Maine, noting that the widow of the testator bad already
survived the expiration of the twenty-five year period, found no violation of the Rule

because the gift of principal was limited on alternative contingencies, and distribution
would in fact be made on the basis of the contingency causing no perpetuities problem,
namely, the death of the widow, a person in being at the testator's death. The court
found it unnecessary to classify interests before resolving the perpetuities question.
Id. at 296, 172 A.2d at 117.
11. Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: the Sperm Bank and the Fertile
Decedent,48 A.B.A.J. 942 (1962).
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after B's death. If no child of B had attained twenty-one at B's death
(thus "closing" the class), such posthumous child might qualify to
share in the fee simple by attaining twenty-one beyond the perpetuities period. The test for validity under the orthodox Rule is a
possibilities test, not a probabilities test nor an actualities test. Even
so, the possibility that a posthumous child of B, conceived by artificial
insemination after B's death, might attain twenty-one beyond the
perpetuities period, does not justify invalidating ab initio the remainder "to such of the children of B as attain twenty-one."
First, the possibility of a posthumous child conceived by artificial
insemination should be rejected if the preservation of sperm were
the result of a scheme by B, successor in interest of A under the
statute of descent and distribution, to secure the land by invalidating
the remainder under the Rule Against Perpetuities. 2 A court that
accepts as a legitimate child of B a posthumous child conceived by
artificial insemination after B's death, 13 can nevertheless refuse to
recognize such child as that of B for the purpose of applying the
Rule Against Perpetuities to the limitation in A's will.
Second, the possibility of a posthumous child conceived by artificial
insemination after the death of the donor husband is a fantastic one,
judged by ordinary standards. The doctrine of fantastic possibilities
is dying out in the perpetuities field.14 That being so, it should not
be extended.
Third, the construction of "children" turns on the presumed intention of the testator. "Children whenever born within B's lifetime
and a period of gestation" is a construction of "children" consistent
with the presumed intention of the testator in the ordinary case.
"Children whenever born to B irrespective of the time of conception" is not a construction within the presumed intention of the
testator in the ordinary case, and should be rejected.
B. Adoption Under the Orthodox Rule
A devises to "B for life, then to B's children for their lives, remainder to the grandchildren of B." Although "grandchildren" is
construed to mean "grandchildren whenever born," the gift to grandchildren is good under the orthodox Rule if "children" is construed
12. A court may refuse relief to one violating conscience or good faith. MCCLINTOaK,
EQurry § 26 (2d ed. 1948); 2 PomERoY, EQvrry JUMSPRUDENCE § 398 (5th ed. 1941);
W .sEr,EQurrY § 53 (1930).
13. For a bizarre case holding a child conceived by artificial insemination illegitimate

despite consent by the mother's husband to use of semen of a third party donor, see
Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 39 Misc. 2d 1083 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Note, 1964
DuoE L.J. 163.
14. Lynn, Reforming the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,28 U. Cm. L. Rrv.
488, 494-99 (1961).
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to mean "children of B who predeceased A or were alive at A's
death." The ultimate number of grandchildren sharing in the gift
will be known at the end of lives in being at A's death, namely, at
the death of the survivor of B's children.
"Children" might be construed to mean "children of B who predeceased A or were alive at A's death" because B was a woman past
the menopause at the execution of A's will, or because B was a man
incapable of conceiving a child at the execution of A's will.'5 The
construction of "children" which saves the gift to grandchildren from
invalidity under the Rule should not be rejected because B might
adopt a child after A's death who was unborn at A's death.
The construction of "children" turns on the presumed intention
of the testator. When we construe "children" to mean "children of
B who predeceased A or were alive at A's death," we are excluding
from the group of "children" both the child of B fantastically born to
B after the execution of A's will and the child adopted by B after A's
death, irrespective of whether or not the adopted child of B is hypothetical, and irrespective of the language of the statutes regulating
adoption and the effects of adoption. We could appropriately so
construe "children" even though we construe "children" to mean
"children of B who predeceased A or were alive at A's death, whether
born to B or adopted by B."
Suppose that an examination of the will and the circumstances
under which it was executed leads us to construe "children" so as
to exclude from the group the child of B fantastically born to B after
the execution of A's will. But we are in doubt with respect to excluding a child unborn at A's death who might be adopted by B after A's
death. A is presumed to know the law, including the law of adoption. If we turn to the statutes regulating adoption for help in construction, we find no uniformity in statutory language. Adoption is
relatively new to the law. The statutory language may be relatively
sweeping in scope:
For all purposes under the laws of this state, including without limitation
all laws and wills governing inheritance of and succession to real or personal
property... a legally adopted child shall have the same status and rights,

and shall bear the same legal relationship to the adopting parents as if

born to them in lawful wedlock and not born to the natural parents .... 16
15. E.g., Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble, 316 Mass. 294, 55 N.E.2d 446
(1944). "Thus we have a case [Marble] where an estate which on its face obviously
violated the Rule was saved by a construction adopted to carry out the presumed intention of the testator. I suppose only a lawyer steeped in the technicalities of the
common law would criticize it." Newhall, Nibbling at the Rule Against Perpetuities,
29 MAss. L.Q. 29, 30 (1944).
16. Omo REv. CODF ANN.§ 3107.13 (Page Supp. 1963).
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Or the language may be relatively narrow in scope: "A lawfully
adopted person and his heirs shall inherit from and through the
adoptive parents the same as a natural born child....-17
Or the language may be quite explicit:
A child lawfully adopted is deemed a descendant of the adopting parent

for purposes of inheritance from the adopting parent and from the lineal
and collateral kindred of the adopting parent. . . . For the purpose of
determining the property rights of any person under any written instrument
executed on or after September 1, 1955, an adopted child is deemed a
natural child unless the contrary intent plainly appears by the terms
thereof....
18

Clearly it is hazardous to generalize about construction solely on

the basis of fragments from three statutes. But does the possibility
that B might adopt a child after As death who was unborn at A's
death compel an Illinois court under the language of the Illinois
adoption statute to invalidate the remainder to grandchildren if A
devises to "B for life, then to B's children for their lives, remainder
to the grandchildren of B"? Although "plainly appears" will cause
some misgivings, the possibility of such an adoption should be rejected for perpetuities purposes.
The language of statutes regulating adoption is general, not specific.
Statutes tend to take the adopted child from the family into which he
was born and put him into the family of his adopting parent or
parents.' 9 However laudable the objective of the statutory language,
it ought not to be read into contexts where it causes more harm than
good. From the fact that we frequently construe "child" or "children"
to include an adopted child or adopted children, it does not follow
that we do so invariably.20 Adoption is still the exception, not the
rule, just as the perpetuities question is still the exception, not the
rule. The exceptional circumstance of adoption should not jeopardize
dispositive instruments generally. When policies of the law conflict,
a sensible resolution of the conflict is called for. For perpetuities
purposes, a child adopted after the death of the testator does not
qualify as an object of his bounty.
III. "WArr AND

SEE" and "WAIT AND

SEE"

COUPLED wmi CY PBES
It is commonly assumed that under "wait and see," or "wait and see"
coupled with cy pres, a determination of the validity of a contingent
17. IowA

PROBATE CODE

§ 223 (West 1963).

18. ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 3,§ 14 (1961). See generally Fleming, Inheritancc Rights
of Adopted Children,35 Cnm. B. REc. 221 (1954).
19. Ham' m & SxoLrc, PROBLEMS OF Tr FAmILY 214 (rev. ed. 1962).
20. Oler, Construction of Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are Concerned (pts. I-H), 43 MIcH. L. REv. 705, 901 (1945); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 12 (1962).

1964]

RAISING THE PERPETUITIES QUESTION

1399

future interest is deferred to a time beyond that at which the instrument of transfer takes effect.2 ' Thus, if A devises "to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first attains twenty-five," and Bis a
bachelor at A's death, the contingent remainder is not necessarily
bad ab initio. A child may be born to B and attain twenty-five within
the perpetuities period, namely, B's lifetime and twenty-one years. If
so, the interest "vests" within the perpetuities period, is "good" or
"valid" under "wait and see," and no reformation is required if cy
pres is coupled with "wait and see."2 If no child of B attains twentyfive within the perpetuities period, the contingent remainder is
"bad" or "void" or "invalid" under "wait and see" alone.
Suppose that B is a bachelor incapable of conceiving a child at
and after A's death. Under the orthodox Rule it is improper to
recognize the fact that the contingent remainder will necessarily fail
by its own terms, and invalidity turns on the fantastic possibility that
B might have a child who might attain twenty-five at a remote time.
Under "wait and see," the inability of B to conceive is a fact that
justifies a declaration of invalidity at A's death. For example, if B
and the successor in interest of A wish to join in a sale of the land,
and marketability turns on securing a declaration of the invalidity
of the contingent remainder, the declaration of invalidity should be
made. To refuse to declare the contingent remainder invalid because
the perpetuities period has not run is absurd unless a case can be
made for deferring the determination of invalidity. What are the
arguments for deferring the determination of invalidity under "wait
and see?"
A. Statutory Language and Traditional Practice
The words of the applicable statute, if any, may lend support to
the case for deferred determination of invalidity. The Pennsylvania
statute, for example, says that "upon the expiration of the period
allowed by the . . .rule against perpetuities as measured by actual
. . .events any interest not then vested . . . shall be void."23 Despite the common inclination to read the Pennsylvania statute as if
it requires a deferred determination of invalidity, the statute does
not tell us when the determination of invalidity is made. Rather, it
tells us the time at which a contingent future interest capable of
vesting is deemed bad. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the deter21. The assumption that under the Pennsylvania legislation we must invariably
defer the determination of invalidity is not always made. Mechem, Further Thoughts
on Pennsylvania PerpetuitiesLegislation, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 974 (1959).
22. Lynn, A Practical Guide to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964 DuKE L.J. 207,
219-23.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
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mination of invalidity is deferred if the contingency might be resolved within the perpetuities period, and under some circumstances
the determination may be deferred to a time beyond the running of
the perpetuities period.2 4 But it does not follow that the determination of invalidity must be deferred in all cases.
It may be traditional in a jurisdiction to refuse to declare a contingent future interest invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities
if the perpetuities question is raised "prematurely." To defer determination of invalidity is indeed a tradition in some jurisdictions.25
The practice may be justifiable under some circumstances, but it is
doubtful that courts purportedly adhering to the tradition do so
consistently, 26 and it is demonstrable that adherence to the tradition
is disgraceful in particular instances.2 7
B. Adoption Under "Wait and See"

The adoption of a child or children who prima facie qualify for
the gift may raise the perpetuities question. Adoptions unquestionably do occur, and statutes regulating adoption do reflect a legislative intention to make the adopted child a member of the family
of the adopting parent or parents. But it does not follow that the
possibility of an adoption justifies deferring the determination of
invalidity of a contingent future interest under the "Wait and see'
version of the Rule. If A devises "to B for life, remainder to that
child of B who first attains twenty-five," we must determine what A
meant by "child of B" under "wait and see," just as we must determine
the meaning of like words under the orthodox Rule. A is presumed
to know the law, including the law of adoption, but even so, "child"
has frequently been construed to mean child born to the ancestor, not
adopted. It should be so construed under "wait and see" unless there
is a persuasive reason for adopting the more unusual construction.
'What do the relevant Pennsylvania statutes say?
The first, a part of the Intestate Act, reads as follows:
The person adopted shall, for all purposes of inheritance and taking by
devolution, be a member of the family of the adopting parent or parents....
Adopted persons shall not be entitled to inherit or take from or through
their natural parents, grandparents, or collateral relatives .... 28
24. Lynn, supranote 22, at 231 n.86.
25. Supra note 1.
26. Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MiN. L. Rrv.
41, 74 (1957).
27. Col. Samuel P. Colt died testate in 1921. As early as 1924 his executor sought
instructions respecting the construction of his will. Industrial Trust Co. v. Alves, 46
R.I. 16, 124 Aft. 260 (1924). Not until 1957 did the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
concede a violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Bank v. Morey, 86 R.I. 15,
133 A.2d 724 (1957).
28. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 20, § 102 (1950).
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The second, a part of the Wills Act, reads as follows:
[In construing a will making a devise or bequest to a person or persons
described by relationship to the testator or to another, any person adopted
before the death of the testator shall be considered the child of his adopting
parent or parents and not the child of his natural parents: Provided, that
if a natural parent shall have married the adopting parent before the
testator's death, the adopted person shall also be considered the child of
29
such natural parent.

Under the Pennsylvania statutes, a child adopted by B would not
qualify as a child of B under A's will, because the adoption is postmortem with respect to A, the testator.30
C. Fertility and Sterility Under "Wait and See"
It is possible that a person incapable of conceiving a child at a
particular time may thereafter become capable of fathering or bearing
a child. 31 Advances in the medical arts are the envy of the legal
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(6) (Purdon Supp. 1963).

30. To defer the perpetuities question because of the possibility of an adoption
leads to an absurd application of the Pennsylvania perpetuities statutes in some cases,
the language of the adoption statutes apart. A devises "to B for life, then to B's
children for their lives, with cross remainders, remainder in fee to the grandchildren
of B." "Grandchildren" is construed to mean "grandchildren of B whenever and to
whomever born." B, and all of B's children alive at A's death, die survived by a child
of B born after A's death. All children born to the after-born child of B are in fact
born no later than twenty-one years after the death of B and all of B's children alive
at A's death. The after-born child of B is still alive after the perpetuities period has
run, but is incapable of conceiving a child. Clearly in Pennsylvania the after-born child
of B cannot invalidate A's gift to the grandchildren of B by adopting a child after the
perpetuities period has run-and thereby gain the fee under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,

§ 301.5(c) (1950).
31. This possibility could be foreclosed by legislation: "(a) if a person is a male of
the age of [55] or over, or a female of the age of [50] or over, at the commencement
of the perpetuities period, he or she shall be conclusively presumed to be incapable
of procreating or bearing a child or children .......
ABA PERPETUtrY LEGISLATION
HANDBOOK 14 (2d ed. 1962).
In Lare's Estate, 57 Pa. D. & C. 163 (Orphans Ct. 1946), Barnsley's Estate, 59
Pa. D. & C. 653 (Orphans Ct. 1947), and Leonard's Estate, 60 Pa. D. & C. 42
(Orphans Ct. 1947), the court ordered termination of a trust at the request of the
life beneficiary where the vesting of a remainder in such beneficiary's issue was precluded by the unlikelihood of her having children and no other person or possible
person had any interest in corpus. In Lare's Estate, petitioner was 69, had never
had children, was past the menopause, and in ill health. In Barnsley's Estate, she was
58, had never married nor given birth to a child, was past the menopause, and in ill
health. In Leonard's Estate, she was 57, unmarried and without issue. Expert
medical testimony to the effect that she could not conceive or bear a child was
received. These cases are cited in Note, 26 TFAi'. L.Q. 148 (1952), as authority for
the proposition that the fertile octogenarian doctrine did not obtain in Pennsylvania at
about the time the perpetuities reform legislation was enacted.
Medical testimony that neither the beneficiary of a testamentary trust nor his wife
was capable of conceiving was received in a recent trust termination case. In re
Bassett's Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 190 A.2d 415 (1963). Note, 62 Mirm L. REv. 1099
(1964).
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profession. We may realistically anticipate continual progress in
nutrition, gynecology, and urology. We may nevertheless find B
incapable of conceiving a child at and after A's death when A devises
"to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first attains twentyfive."
The finding is made on the basis of evidence.-

The evidence may

include opinions from experts. The opinions of experts may not be
harmonious.33 Even so, a finding must be made if the perpetuities
question is otherwise properly raised.

D. Preservation of Sperm Under "Wait and See"
Sperm may be preserved for a period of years.4 If B is personally
incapable of conceiving a child at and after A's death, he may nevertheless father a child by artificial insemination if he has preserved
his sperm. If so, he is capable of conceiving a child at and after
A's death, and the perpetuities question is properly deferred to a
time beyond that at which the instrument of transfer takes effect.
To the extent that deferring the perpetuities question turns on the
preservation of sperm, it need not be deferred beyond B's lifetime
for two reasons. (1) The construction of "child" turns on the presumed intention of the testator. "Child whenever born within B's
lifetime and a period of gestation" is consistent with the presumed
intention of the testator in the ordinary case. "Child whenever born
to B irrespective of the time of conception" is not within the presumed
intention of the testator. (2) No posthumous child of B could attain
twenty-five within the perpetuities period, namely, B's lifetime and
twenty-one years.
To the extent that deferring the perpetuities question turns on the
preservation of sperm, that question may properly be raised during
B's lifetime if the effectiveness of the sperm ends.
Generally speaking, coupling cy pres with "wait and see" does not
militate against the result suggested in the case put. If B is incapable
of conceiving a child at and after A's death, the contingent remainder
cannot be reformed to save it from failure by its own terms. But if B
has preserved his sperm and conceives by artificial insemination a
child who is born within B's lifetime and the normal period of gesta32. A preponderance of the evidence should be sufficient. An Australian statute
requires "such evidence of a high degree of improbability of procreating or childbearing
as [the court] thinks proper as establishing the incapacity." Law Reform Act, 1962,
11 Eliz. 2, No. 83, § 3 (W. Austl.). There is no persuasive reason for departing from
the usual standard of proof in perpetuities cases. See generally Leach, Perpetuities:
New Hampshire Defertilizes the Octogenarians, 77 Hav. L. REv. 279 (1963).
33. McCosumcr, EVIDENCE 28, 32 (1954).
34. Supra note 11.
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tion, reformation could be resorted to, if appropriate, to reduce the
age contingency from twenty-five to twenty-one in order that the
child of B might qualify for the gift within the perpetuities period.
IV. Cy PnXs

If A devises "to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first
attains twenty-five," and B is a bachelor at A's death, personally incapable of conceiving a child, what are the arguments for reformation
under cy pres at the urging of A's executor, rather than a declaration
of invalidity at the urging of B and the successor in interest of A who
wish to join in a sale of the land?
A. Preservation of Sperm Under Cy Pres
If B has preserved his sperm, he is capable of conceiving a child.
The contingent remainder may therefore be reformed at or after the
probate of A's will to read "remainder to that child of B who first
attains twenty-one." The possibility of conception by artificial insemination should be indulged no longer than the effective life of
the sperm or the lifetime of B, whichever is the shorter. For example,
if reformation is sought two years after B's death because sperm of B
is in existence, reformation should be refused and the remainder
declared invalid because it failed by its own terms. "Child whenever
born within B's lifetime and a period of gestation" is consistent with
the presumed intention of the testator in the ordinary case. "Child
whenever born to B irrespective of the time of conception" is not
within the presumed intention of the testator.
B. Adoption Under Cy Pres
Should a declaration of invalidity be refused because B might
adopt a child who might attain twenty-one under the gift as reformed? If B and the successor in interest of A wish to join in a sale
of the land, should a court at the urging of the executor reform
"remainder to that child of B who first attains twenty-five" to read
"remainder to that child born to or adopted by B who first attains
twenty-one"? It is doubtful that such reformation ordinarily "give(s)
effect to the general intent of the creator of the interest," 35 although
consulting California statutes regulating adoption and the effects of
adoption as an aid to ascertaining testamentary intention shows that
the California act is no insurmountable bar to including an adopted
child of B within the purview of A's will. It reads as follows:
35. CAr.. Civ.

CoD

ANN.§ 715.5.

1404

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 17

An adopted child shall be deemed a descendant of one who has adopted
him, the same as a natural child, for all purposes of succession by, from or
through the adopting parent the same as a natural parent .... 36

Even so, a declaration of invalidity under the "ey pres" version of
the Rule is permissible at A's death if B and the successor in interest
of A wish to join in a sale of the land and marketability turns on
securing the declaration. To refuse the declaration on the ground
that B might adopt a child 37 who might qualify for the remainder
as reformed is to stand cy pres on its head. Under the Rule in
orthodox form, a declaration of the invalidity of the contingent remainder is permissible at A's death. Although B is a bachelor incapable of conceiving a child, invalidity under the orthodox Rule turns
on the fantastic possibility that B might have a child who might attain
twenty-five at a remote time. Indulging fantastic possibilities has
brought the orthodox Rule into disrepute. Why deny a declaration
of invalidity under the cy pres version of the Rule on the possibility
-however unlikely-that the very person seeking the declaration of
invalidity might adopt a child who might qualify for the remainder
as reformed?
V. CONCLUSION

It bears emphasis that reforming the Rule Against Perpetuities
does not eliminate perpetuities problems-it minimizes them. It is
significant that the word "vest" continues to appear in reform legislation despite the censure which that word has justifiably evoked.
"Vest" has a comfortable ring, and the word dies hard. Lawyers
and judges will continue to face difficult questions of construction
under the Rule in orthodox, "wait and see," and cy pres forms.
There is, nevertheless, a significant new development. Both the
"wait and see" and cy pres versions of the Rule require us to face
facts, including those of fertility, sterility, conception, and adoption.
The facts of life are relatively new to perpetuities law, but judges
are clearly free under the new versions of the Rule to interpret the
law in a sensible fashion.38 Even under the Rule in orthodox form
36. CAL. PRoB. CODE ANN. § 257. Succession is the acquisition of title to the
property of one who dies without disposing of it by will. CAL. Pnon. CODM ANN. §
200.
37. Note, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 441 (1958).
38. "Certainly our function is not to interpret the rule [against perpetuities] so as
Our task is not to block the business pathway
to create commercial anomalies ....
but to clear it, defining it by guideposts that are reasonably to be expected." Wong
v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 533-34, 386 P.2d 817, 823 (1963), holding that a lease
to commence upon the completion of a building by the lessor did not violate the
Rule. Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958),
holding such a lease void because the building might not be completed within the
perpetuities period, was specifically disapproved by the Supreme Court of California
in Wong.
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they are free to adapt the Rule to changing conditions. Facts should
be faced in the context of a perpetuities question-a question that
occurs infrequently, that affects few instruments, and few persons.
Constructions given words in other contexts should not be used in
perpetuities cases if doctrine is thereby made absurd or the reasonable expectations of the grantor, settlor, or testator defeated.
No version of the Rule tells us with precision when the perpetuities
question will be raised. "Wait and see" sets the time limit within
which a contingent future interest must vest, if at all, or fail under
the Rule Against Perpetuities. "Wait and see" does not tell us when
the declaration of invalidity is made. Cy pres tells us that a contingent future interest, bad under the Rule in orthodox form, may be
reformed. Cy pres does not tell us that reformation will occur, nor
when it occurs, if it occurs at all.
A mastery of the mechanics of the Rule will continue to be a
prerequisite to solving a perpetuities question properly, irrespective
of the form that the Rule takes. As outworn niceties of the Rule are
discarded, new facets of the Rule appear. There is little evidence
that the lot of the property lawyer has ever been an easy one.
There is nothing in the perpetuities reform movement to suggest
that it is about to become so.
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